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League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. 
Alaska 2019) 
 
Adam W. Johnson 
 
 A consortium of environmental groups brought suit challenging 
an executive order opening millions of acres of continental shelf lands to 
oil and gas leasing. The Court held that the President’s actions exceeded 
his statutory authority and intruded on Congress’s power under the 




League of Conservation Voters v. Trump involved a statutory 
interpretation of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 
specifically whether the text of Section 12(a) of OCSLA authorizes the 
President to revoke a prior withdrawal of unleased Outer Continental Shelf 
(“OCS”) lands from oil and gas leasing.1 
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska found 
that the text, structure, and legislative history of OCSLA indicated that 
Congress intended to delegate to the President only the authority to 
withdraw OCS lands from leasing, and not the commensurate  power to 
revoke a prior President’s withdrawal.2 Thus, President Trump’s executive 
order revoking a prior withdrawal was unlawful and invalid.3 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1953, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
in order to give the United States jurisdiction over OCS lands and 
tfacilitate the development of oil and gas extraction leases. 4  OCSLA 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant and regulate leases for oil 
and gas extraction on OCS lands.5 Additionally, Section 12(a) of OCSLA 
states that “The President of the United States may, from time to time, 
withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer 
Continental Shelf.”6 Pursuant to Section 12(a), President Obama, in 2015 
and 2016, issued an executive order and three memoranda withdrawing 
specific areas of the OCS from leasing. 7 These withdrawals were intended 
to last for an indefinite period of time, revocable only by an act of 
 
1.  League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. 
Alaska 2019). 
2.  Id. at 1030. 
3.  Id. 
 4.   Id. at 1016; see Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) 
(codified as 43 U.S.C. § 1341-1356 (2012)). 
5.  Id.  
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
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Congress.8  President Obama cited concerns over protection of marine 
mammals and wildlife that are crucial to the subsistence of Alaska Natives 
as the impetus for the withdrawal.9 In April 2017, President Trump issued 
Executive Order 13795 (“Executive Order”), purporting to reverse 
President Obama’s 2015 and 2016 withdrawals in the Arctic and Atlantic 
Oceans.10  
On May 3, 2017, a consortium of Environmental NGOs 
(“Plaintiffs) sued President Donald Trump, Secretary of Interior Ryan 
Zinke, and Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross (“Defendants”) in U.S. 
District Court alleging Executive Order 1375 exceeded the President’s 
statutory authority under Section 12(a) of OCSLA, and “intruded on 
Congress’s non-delegated exclusive power under the Property Clause, in 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.”11 After the Court denied 





 The parties presented differing interpretations of the textual 
meaning of Section 12(a) of OCSLA, as well as the legislative intent and 
the significance of executive actions taken subsequent to the passage of 
OCSLA. Plaintiffs argued that the text of Section 12(a) “does not 
expressly authorize the President to revoke a prior withdrawal, and that in 
the absence of express delegation of its power under the Property Clause, 
the authority to revoke prior withdrawals “remains vested solely with 
Congress.”13 
 Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of OCSLA would 
render parts of the statute superfluous, and that Section 12(a)'s 
“discretionary formulation—authorizing action that ‘may’ be taken ‘from 
time to time’—carries with it a power to revise action previously taken 
under the delegated authority.”14 They also argued that Congress’s failure 
to object to several prior modifications or reductions of withdrawals 
pursuant to Section 12(a) represented acquiescence to the President’s 






8.  Id. at 1022. 
9.  League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990 
(D. Alaska 2018). 
10.  Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, Exec. 
Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815, §§ 4(c), 5 (Apr. 28, 2017). 
11.  Id. at 991. 
12.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1017. 
13.  Id. at 1021.  
14.  Id. at 1020. 
15.  Id. at 1030. 
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A.  Text of Section 12(a) of OCSLA 
 
 The text of Section 12(a) of OCLSA reads, in relevant part: “The 
President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from 
disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”16 The 
Defendants argued that the phrase “from time to time” conferred upon the 
President the power to revoke prior withdrawals, and cited an assortment 
of non-binding authority in support of their claim. 17  In particular, 
Defendants relied on State v. McBride, a 1902 Washington Supreme Court 
decision concerning a Washington state constitutional provision which 
empowered the legislature to, “from time to time,” increase the number of 
judges sitting on its supreme court. 18  In McBride, the Washington 
legislature passed a law temporarily increasing the number of judges to 
seven, with the number decreasing back to five in one year’s time.19 A 
citizen sued, arguing that the Washington Constitution only gave the 
legislature authority to increase the number of judges.  
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, holding that if the 
legislature has the power to increase the number of judges at its sole 
discretion, “it follows that a decrease may be had to this minimum when 
necessity or occasion requires, of which necessity or occasion the 
legislature is the exclusive judge.”20 The McBride Court also noted that 
the fact that the Washington Constitution placed a minimum limit and 
permitted an increase in the number of judges “is a strong inference that 
the increased number may be reduced to the minimum.”21  
The Court distinguished McBride from the case at hand. 
For one, the President is not the “exclusive judge” of which OCS lands are 
available for lease, as the Washington state legislature was with regard to 
the number of judges on their supreme court. 22  Second, unlike the 
minimum number of judges set forth in the Washington Constitution, “no 
such minimum limit exists in Section 12(a) with respect to the lands 
available for leasing in the OCS.”23  
The Court proceeded to make several observations about the text 
of Section 12(a). First, Section 12(a) makes no mention of Presidential 
authority to revoke a previous withdrawal of OCS lands from disposition, 
and the Court noted that “[C]ongress appears to have expressed one 
concept—withdrawal—and excluded the converse—revocation.” 24 
Furthermore, the Court found that the phrase “from time to time” appeared 
to merely give the President discretion to withdraw lands at any time, with
 
16.  43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012). 
17.  League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. 
18.  Id. at 1022–23 (quoting State ex rel. Murphy v. McBride, 70 P. 25, 
26–27 (Wash. 1902). 
19.  Id.  
20.  Id.  
21.  Id.  
22.  Id. at 1023.  
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
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the duration of any given withdrawal also at the President’s discretion.25 
However, the Court also noted that “the phrase could be interpreted more 
broadly to accord to each President the authority to revoke or modify any 
prior withdrawal.”26 In light of this ambiguity, the Court undertook an 
analysis of the context and legislative history of OCSLA to ascertain the 
intentions of Congress with respect to Section 12(a). 
 
B.  Structure and Legislative History of OCSLA 
 
 As a matter of statutory interpretation, a statute should be read as 
a whole, and to the extent possible, should be interpreted to “give effect to 
all provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.”27 Section 8 of OCSLA gives the Secretary of the Interior 
the power to lease OCS lands, “in order to meet the urgent need for further 
exploration and development of the oil and gas deposits.”28 Section 12, 
however, is “entirely protective” in nature, dealing with restrictions on the 
uses of OCS lands.29 The Court held that “OCSLA's structure promotes 
the view that Section 12(a) did not grant revocation authority to the 
President,” because interpreting Section 8 to promote “expeditious leasing” 
while reading Section 12(a) as merely granting the President authority to 
ban leasing in certain areas gives fuller effect to the differing roles of all 
OCSLA’s sections.30 
 The parties also presented differing interpretations of the 
legislative history of Section 12(a). The Defendants referenced a Senate 
report in which the Committee on Interior and Consular Affairs said, “it 
was vesting withdrawal authority comparable to that which is vested in 
[the President] with respect to federally owned lands on the uplands.”31 
According to the Defendants, since the President has the power to revoke 
withdrawals on the uplands, “Section 12(a) should be interpreted to do the 
same.”32 
 In contrast, the Plaintiffs cited several statutes similar to OCSLA 
to stand for the proposition that when Congress has intended to delegate 
authority to withdraw public land from disposition along with the power 
to revoke such withdrawals, it has done so clearly and unequivocally.33 
For example, the Picket Act of 1910 not only gave the President the 
authority to “temporarily withdraw” public lands, but expressly said that 
such withdrawals would be effective “until revoked by the President or by 
 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. at 1025 (quoting Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 
824 (2018). 
28.  Id. at 1024 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).  
29.  Id.  
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. at 1025 (quoting S. Rep. No. 83-411, at 26 (1953). 
32.  Id. at 1026. 
33.  Id.  
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an Act of Congress.”34 Similarly, a 1935 act “concerning use of the Rio 
Grande” explicitly conferred both the power to withdraw and to revoke.35 
The Court compared these to statutes passed prior to OCSLA where 
Congress delegated to the President only the power to set aside lands, not 
to revoke.36 The Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Forest Reserve Act of 
1891 both authorized the reservation of public lands, with no mention of 
revocation.37 The Court found this highly persuasive, holding that “had 
Congress intended to grant the President revocation authority, it could 
have done so explicitly, as it had previously done in several (but not all) 
of its previously enacted uplands laws.”38 They reasoned that the lack of 
revocation authority in Section 12(a) was therefore “likely purposeful.”39 
 Finally, the Court assessed Plaintiffs’ argument that prior 
Attorneys General opinions have interpreted statutes similar to OCSLA as 
not providing the President with the power to revoke reservations, and that 
“[w]hen it chooses the wording of a statute, Congress is presumptively 
aware of Executive Branch interpretations of similar language in parallel 
statutes.”40 An 1848 opinion by the Attorney General said that “if lands 
have been once set apart by the President in an order for military purposes, 
they cannot again be restored to the condition of public lands, or sold as 
such, except by an authority of Congress.” 41  Accordingly, the Court 
agreed that in the past, when Congress wanted the Executive to have 
revocation authority, it has delegated that power explicitly. Therefore, 
“Congress intended to authorize the President only to withdraw OCS lands 
from leasing in Section 12(a) of OCSLA, and did not authorize the 




 Lastly, the Court considered Defendants’ argument that in the past, 
Congress has not objected to presidential modifications or reductions of 
prior withdrawals, and therefore “Congress has acquiesced to the 
President's authority to revoke under the statute.”43 Since the passage of 
OCSLA, there have been just twelve actions taken pursuant to Section 
12(a). According to the Defendants, five of those actions involved 
modifications while two were reductions of prior withdrawals.44
 
34.  Id. (quoting Picket Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), repealed by 90 
Stat. 2792 (1976)). 
35.  Id.  
36.  Id. at 1027. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. (quoting Camp Wright, California, 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 121, 123 
(Aug. 10, 1878)). 
42.  Id. at 1028. 
43.  Id. at 1030. 
44.  Id. 
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The Court was not convinced, saying that “Congress's decisions 
not to challenge the small number of prior revocations falls far short of the 
high bar required to constitute acquiescence.”45  Too little information 
existed surrounding the reasons for Congress’s “limited inaction,” and so 
was insufficient to overcome the Court’s findings regarding the text and 




 Based on the text, structure, and legislative history of Section 
12(a), the Court held President Trump’s Executive Order to be unlawful 
and invalid.47 Therefore, the previous withdrawals issued by President 
Obama “will remain in full force and effect unless and until revoked by 
Congress.”48 Additionally, the power to revoke any future reservations 
under Section 12(a) of OCSLA remains vested solely with Congress. This 
is significant not only for the preservation of the 128 million acres 
preserved by the Obama Section 12(a) withdrawals, but also for similar 
future or past withdrawals under OCSLA or made pursuant to similar 





45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 1031. 
